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_____________________________________________________ 
The interdependence of intra- and inter-subjectivity in  
constructivist institutionalism 
 
Colin Hay, Sciences Po, Paris 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
                ³ - Who is to say what is moral?   
  - Morality is subjective.  
  - Subjectivity is objective.  Moral notions imply attributes to substances 
which exist only in relational duality.  Not as an essential extension of 
ontological existence.  
 - Can we not talk about sH[VRPXFK"´ 
   (Woody Allen, Love and Death, 1975). 
 
 
Counterintuitive though it might seem, it is almost DOZD\VDSOHDVXUHWRUHVSRQGWRRQH¶V
critics, particularly those, like Oscar Larsson, who have taken the trouble to carefully and 
thoroughly read the work that prompts the critique. That pleasure is further enhanced on this 
occasion by my own sense, at least, of the significance of the issues at stake here and a more 
general concern (one that I suspect I share with Larsson) that they have yet to receive the 
attention their significance warrants. Yet, this notwithstanding, I find myself in the not-
unfamiliar situation of first having to clarify my position and to correct certain 
misunderstandings of it before I FDQEHJLQWRDGGUHVVWKHZLGHULVVXHVUDLVHGE\/DUVVRQ¶V
important intervention.   
 /DUVVRQ¶VFKDUJH²for though appreciative, this is after all, a critique²is that the 
constructivist institutionalism that I defend and the variant of ontological constructivism on 
which it is ostensibly predicated are both, in the end, subjectivist with respect to ideas. By this, 
he means that my position ³does not take into consideration the constitutive and structural 
DVSHFWRILGHDV´DQGFRQVHTXHQWO\UHGXFHV LGHDV³WRSURSHUWLHVRILQGLYLGXDOFRQVFLRXV
PLQGV´Larsson 2015, 174). This alleged subjectivism, in turn, compromises my apparently 
otherwise laudable efforts to accord an (appropriately) significant role to ideas in the analysis 
of institutional change.   
Larsson is perhaps less clear than he might be as to why my putative subjectivism is a 
problem in any sense other than that it violates his own predilection for a less subjectivist 
view of ideas. But, presumably, and as at times he hints, ideational subjectivism is a poor 
foundation for an analysis of institutional change since it smacks of voluntarism²implying 
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that all that actors need to do to enact (institutional) change is think different thoughts about 
the (institutional) context in which they find themselves (and, presumably, act upon them). 
 I agree with much of this²both what is stated explicitly by Larsson and also those 
implicit elements that I have inferred from it (the bit about voluntarism in the preceding 
paragraph, for instance). Subjectivism does tend towards voluntarism; voluntarism, in turn, 
makes institutional change appear far simpler than it invariably is. What I do not agree with, 
however, is the characterization of my own position. This I do not regard as in any sense 
subjectivist. Indeed, were it genuinely subjectivist²as Larsson, in a sense, implies²it could 
not be genuinely constructivist.   
 Telling, in this respect, is a passage to which we will have occasion to return in more 
detail presently. Here, in discussing my account of interest formation, Larsson suggests the 
following: 
 
+D\¶VDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWWKDW. . .  >DFWRUV¶@SHUFHSWLRQV>RIWKHLULQWHUHVWs]  
are ³socially constructed´ amounts to saying that they are subjective rather  
than inter-subjective. (Larsson 2015, 188)   
 
It is not difficult, I think, to see that there is a problem here. Things that are socially 
constructed (social facts) are not, and can never be, purely subjective²even if there might 
well be (as I shall argue) important subjective elements to how we encounter, experience, and 
act with respect to them. Pure subjectivity is asocial, by definition. Conversely, and for 
precisely the same reason, the social is inter-subjective OLWHUDOO\FRQGXFWHGµEHWZHHQ
VXEMHFWV¶.1 Hence, logically, that which is socially constructed is, to the extent that it is 
socially constructed, inter-subjective.   
 There are, then, two ways of rHDGLQJ/DUVVRQ¶VVHQWHQFHEither he is unaware that it is 
logically impossible for something to be both socially constructed and purely subjective, or 
the irony is intended²and I am the one unaware of the necessarily inter-subjective character 
of the process of social construction. The interpretive ambiguity here must persist. For it is not 
one that I alone can resolve. Dare I suggest, it can surely be resolved inter-subjectively! 
 But that is not really the point. Much more important is that, however in the end we 
might agree WRUHDG/DUVVRQ¶VUHWRUWHLWKHUVRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLYLVPLWVHOIRUP\SDUWLFXODU
interpretation of it leads to an (unfortunate) privileging of subjectivity in its treatment of ideas.  
In what follows I hope to show that neither is in fact the case, and that the charge of 
subjectivism is, as a consequence, undeserved.   
 In doing so, it is perhaps useful to draw on what was certainly intended as the clearest 
and most sustained discussion of the constructivist ontological premises of the 
                                                 
1
 I prefer ³inter-subjective´ to the now more habitual ³intersubjective´ precisely to emphasize the 
necessarily social character of inter-subjective processes.    
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institutionalism that I seek here to clarify and, at least in part, to defend.2  To be fair to 
Larsson, the essay in which it is contained (Hay 2017) had not been published (though I 
suspect it had been written) when he penned the critique to which I here respond.   
 
On Social Facts and Social Facticity 
In that essay, I return to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann and, above all, to John Searle, in 
seeking to show how my self-styled ³constructivist institutionalism´ builds out of, and is in 
fact entirely compatible with, their ontological constructivism. That ontology, in essence, 
comes in two parts.  
In the first, ³reality´ LQ6HDUOH¶VWHUPV³facticity´LVXQGHUVWRRGDV³DTXDOLW\
appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being independent of our own 
volition,´ LQWKDW³ZHFDQQRWZLVKWKHPDZD\´Searle 1966, 13; see also Searle 1995, 2005, 
and 2010). What it important about this is that, contrary to many (for instance, realist) 
understandings of reality, it suggests that facticity is not (or, at least, not necessarily) 
knowledge-independent. Accordingly, it allows us to posit as real things that exist only 
insofar as, or largely to the extent that, an inter-subjective consensus exists as to their 
existence and as to the nature of that existence. If, as, and when that inter-subjective 
consensus changes, so too does the nature of the thing itself. Examples might include a 
³marriage´ a unit of economic exchange, or a condition of ³crisis´  
The second part of %HUJHUDQG/XFNPDQQ¶Vontology²in effect, an implication of the 
first (if, perhaps, not an immediately obvious one)²is the distinction between ³natural´ or 
³brute´ facts on the one hand and ³social´ facts on the other. That distinction, and the 
categorical nature of it as a distinction, are perhaps best understood by way of an example. 
Consider the five-euro note in my pocket. It has a natural or physical facticity (a shape, a 
weight, a flexibility, a chemical composition, a certain propensity to resist catching fire in the 
absence of an open flame at room temperature, and so forth). But it also has a social facticity 
²and, in this case at least, a social utility associated with that facticity (I might well be able 
to use it at the bar when I come to settle up my tab). And that social utility (like the social 
facticity from which it is derived), it is not very difficult to see, is in no sense reducible to its 
natural facticity. Its social value (whether understood in purely economic terms or more 
generally) is by no means intrinsic to it as a piece of paper and, crucially for constructivists, is 
bestowed upon it socially (and hence inter-subjectively). If the inter-subjective consensus that 
                                                 
2
 Since the constructivism that animates my institutionalism is largely ontological, and since 
ontologies, for me at least, do not contain empirical propositions that can be readily tested, the defense 
that I offer is a limited one. Thus, whilst I seek to defend the internal coherence of my approach and 
try to guard against potential misreadings, I do not defend it in the sense of proselytizing for it as 
somehow ³better´ than institutionalisms informed by different ontologies (rationalist, historicist, post-
structuralist, and so forth).   
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makes it what it is changes²if perhaps, the country in which I am resident chooses to use a 
different medium of exchange or currency (it leaves the Eurozone, perhaps)²then its social 
value and hence its social facticity changes, too (it becomes a less potent weapon in my search 
for vinous gratification).   
 Of course, the natural and social facticity of the five-euro note are not entirely 
unrelated. As already noted, the note has both characteristics (though the same cannot be said 
of all social facts). And, in this case at least, the two are integrally connected. The note works 
as a unit of exchange only because we know it to be a unit of exchange, certainly; but it works 
as a unit of exchange also because it is sufficiently portable and sufficiently immune to 
spontaneous combustion to give it the physical (or natural) attributes that make it readily and 
conveniently exchangeable. It is presumably for these reasons, inter alia, that we do not use 
mountains, phosphorous, or rice paper as currency.   
 Now let us turn to politics. It is necessarily inter-subjective, in that it amounts to the 
(always temporary) resolution of social contingency in the making and taking of decisions 
that are recognized inter-subjectively as having legitimacy or, at least, force. [ÅColin: Not 
sure if this will gain your asset%XWPDQ\WKLQJVWKDWDUHQ¶WSROLWLFDOKDYHVRFLDOFRQVHTXHQFHV
such as earthquakes.²Jeff] Only if something is asocial (here, if it is and remains purely 
subjective) and/or non-contingent (in the sense that it could not be otherwise) is it not political.   
 As I hope this serves to demonstrate, for constructivists, social facts are different in 
character and kind from natural facts, in that they acquire both their facticity and the 
ontologically distinct character of that facticity from processes that are inter-subjective rather 
than subjective. As the focus on social/discursive construction would imply, any genuine 
constructivism cannot be guilty of the subjectivist bias Larsson detects.   
 Important implications follow from this, especially for political analysis and especially 
when it comes to the treatment of ideas. First, ideas²and shared (or inter-subjectively held) 
ideas, at that²are the basis of social facticity. This is, of course, not to suggest that social 
facts are not interpreted, made sense of, and interacted with (at least in part) subjectively. But 
it is to suggest that their existence as social facts is conditional only on the inter-subjective 
consensus from which they arise.  Moreover, the fact that they are conditional on such an 
inter-subjective consensus renders social facticity contingent in a way that natural facticity is 
not. This brings us to a second, crucial, point: that social (or inter-subjective) contingency²
the propensity for social facts to change (as the consensus from which they arise varies)²
arguably renders all social facts political. Politics, in other words, at least from a 
constructivist perspective, is social contingency²and the (ultimately, always unsuccessful) 
attempt to resolve it through the imposition of a new, but never final, consensus.   
 This, too, has implications. Above all, it reminds us that all politics is social (Hay 
2007, ch. 1). The political is a necessarily inter-subjective space. Consequently, the very 
identification of something (an issue, a dilemma, an interest, a concern) as the subject of a 
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political analysis (constructivist or otherwise) is the opening of a window on a set of 
processes that are necessarily inter-subjective, even if they involve only the clash of narrowly 
subjective preferences.3 And, as that perhaps also reminds us, in order to have some notion of 
inter-subjectivity, we need also some conception of subjectivity. It makes no logical sense 
(certainly if we are to retain the terminology) to dissolve the subjective into the inter-
subjective, as Larsson at times seem to recommend.   
 
From Subjectivism to Intra-Subjectivism 
That final observation is, I think, particularly important. For it suggests a subtle, but 
potentially very significant, semantic difference between the charge of subjectivism from 
which I have thus far sought to defend constructivism (and its institutionalism) and the 
specific charge of subjectivism that Larsson presents.  
Thus far I have argued that constructivism is, in a sense, incapable of being 
subjectivist²in that its foundational focus on social facts as political, as contingent, and as 
politically contingent upon inter-subjectively established consensus, means that its defining 
problematique is one of inter-subjectivity. It is not clear to me whether Larsson would accept 
this. But it is at least possible that he might and yet still continue to charge constructivist 
institutionalism with a somewhat different form of subjectivism.  
To make clear the distinction and for want of a better term, lHW¶VFDOOLWLQWUD-
subjectivism. The claim (and hence the charge) of intra-subjectivism I here take to imply that, 
in explaining (or, at least, seeking to explain) outcomes in a context that is acknowledged to 
be political and hence inter-subjective, I (and others who might be similarly accused) are 
prepared to countenance, as causally significant, ideas (and the agency to which those ideas 
might be seen to give rise) that are subjective²or, to be consistent, intra-subjective. By intra-
subjective, here, I mean ideas that, however they might have come to be acquired and held, 
are specific to the individual subject in question, in the sense that no other subject is assumed 
to hold them in quite the same way and for quite the same reasons. They are, certainly in this 
respect, intra-subjectively sui generis. Put differently, we cannot derivHDQDFWRU¶VLQWUD)-
subjectivity from her social context or conditioning. Actors (even similarly situated actors) are, 
in short and thus understood, non-interchangeable.    
 Spelled out in this way, the charge of intra-subjectivism is altogether different from 
the accusation against which I have thus far sought to defend constructivist institutionalism.  
If it is a sin at all, it is certainly a rather different and arguably a rather lesser one. In fact, 
insofar as the charge might be warranted (and the label might be deemed appropriate), intra-
subjectivism is, as I hope to show, perfectly compatible with constructivism. Let me try and 
explain before providing an illustration.   
                                                 
3
 The point being that, at the moment when subjective preferences clash (even if not before), they 
become inter-subjective.   
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The culprit here, I suspect, is my treatment of the concept of self-interest, on which 
Larsson lavishes considerable (critical) attention. Yet there is a certain irony here. For what he 
overlooks is the relatively low salience that I give to instrumental considerations (the narrow 
pursuit of self-interest and self-interest alone) in the motivation of political conduct (Hay 
2011). Thus, whilst there is of course plenty of evidence of political actors acting in 
accordance with their currently prevailing sense of their own self-interest (whether 
individually or collectively), there is also plenty of evidence of political actors putting aside 
narrow considerations of self-interest in favor of other motivational dispositions (such as the 
simple desire to conform with their peers or, indeed, the rather more edifying pursuit of some 
greater normative good such as the attainment of a condition of distributive justice or of 
equality of rights and status for others).   
 I suspect that this argument for recognizing the polyvalent character of motivational 
dispositions, and the complex decisions involved in managing the tradeoffs between them, is 
PHUHO\OLNHO\WRFRPSRXQG/DUVVRQ¶VSURblem with my approach. For I imagine that he would 
suggest that it, too, is intra-subjectivist²in that it sees the political subject as the locus for 
such decisions. But I simply do not see how it can be any other way. Yes, political subjects 
are themselves the focus of (invariably) inter-subjective pressures to conform or to place this 
or that motivational disposition above another. But, in the end, how they respond to such 
pressures is not something determined simply by the extent or nature of them. It is, in short, 
neither purely inter-subjective nor purely intra-subjective, but a product of the 
interdependence of the two.   
 If this is accepted, it has profound implications. For if individual subjects are, as surely 
they must be, differentially exposed to inter-subjective political appeals and persuasions of 
this kind, and if those appeals and persuasions to which they are exposed are processed, 
mediated, and responded to differently by them (by virtue of their then-existing subjectivity 
and the complex socialization processes out of which is has been forged), then the effects are 
bound to vary from one individual to another (and, indeed, over time). That we should expect 
such outcomes to vary at the level of the individual is not in any sense, however, a disavowal 
of the (significantly) inter-subjective (and political) character of the processes in and through 
which that variation arises.   
 This remains, I suspect, both rather cryptic and rather abstract. To cement the point, 
then, it is perhaps useful to simplify things just a little and to imagine a hypothetical scenario 
LQZKLFKDFWRUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHLURZQVHOI-interest have the utmost salience²such that we 
can assume that their political conduct is a simple product of their perceived self-interest. The 
question becomes the following: how is this sense of their own self-interest achieved? The 
constructivist approach to this, in a way, is very simple. It is to acknowledge and to emphasize 
 7 
that the question of self-interest is interpretively ambiguous²and, consequently, socially and 
politically contingent.   
 7RPDNHWKLVPRUHVSHFLILFOHW¶VFRQVLder my own sense of my own self-interest. I am, 
to pick a few potentially salient sociological variables, a white, male professor and a public-
sector employee. My sense of my own self-interest is interpretively ambiguous in the sense 
that, in any given situation, it could credibly be resolved differently. Were I to conceive of my 
interest in terms of my masculinity (God forbid), I would almost certainly conceive of it 
differently than if I were to conceive of it in terms of my status as a public-sector employee, 
for instance. Moreover, those with whom I am likely to perceive myself to have a shared 
interest (which we might advance collectively) are also likely to vary depending on the 
differential salience I accord to those potential descriptors of my political identity (white, 
male, public sector employee and so forth). And, of course, in all of this I am likely to be 
subject to a variety of forms of political persuasion²political parties perhaps appealing to me 
on the basis of this or that social attribute that I might share with others, colleagues 
encouraging me to recognize the shared collective interest public sector-workers have under 
conditions of austerity, and so forth. I am likely to be skeptical, at least to some extent, of 
some of these claims²not least through my sense of having been disappointed in the past by 
those making equivalent claims and appeals. And out of all of this I try credibly to conjure a 
sense of my own self-interest and, indeed, a sense of those, if any, with whom I might share 
that interest and how best I, or we, might advance that interest. That sense²indeed, those 
various senses (of what my interest is, with whom I might share it, and of how best to advance 
it) ²are all intra-subjective in the way in which I have defined and used the term above. For, 
in the final analysis, each arises from my own sense of my own interest and not someone 
HOVH¶VThat sense may well be similar to that of others who have, like me, chosen (for now) to 
accord a high political salience to their status as, say, public-sector employees, and who have 
proved similarly receptive (for now) to the appeal of a party or union professing to stand for 
that interest. But it will be never be identical to theirs, because it is mine and because it carries, 
as a consequence, traces of my socialization, my experience, and my peculiarities, 
specificities, and peccadillos as a political subject. Yet that does not mean that it is not inter-
subjectively formed and negotiated. My sense of my own self-interest is, then, once again, the 
product of a fusion of intra- and inter-subjectivity.   
 
 Intra- and Inter-Subjectivity in Practice 
I hope that in this necessarily brief discussion, I have done enough to convince the reader²
and perhaps even Larsson himself²that the constructivist institutionalism that animates my 
approach to political analysis is not inter-subjectivist in any strong sense. And, that if it is 
judged inter-subjectivist at all, that that is not quite so heinous a crime as it might at first 
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appear. I certainly hope to have established that any genuine constructivism, by virtue of its 
ontology of social facticity, is incapable of subjectivism in the narrow sense.   
 But that is perhaps not quite enough. In conclusion, and with the help of another 
H[DPSOH,ZDQWWRWXUQGLUHFWO\WRWKHNH\LVVXHWKDW,WKLQN/DUVVRQ¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQSRVHV: an 
issue that, arguably, neither of us has yet dealt with adequately. In this respect, however, we 
are in good company. The issue in question is the relationship between intra- and inter-
subjectivity, and the example I will pick is the politics of crisis narration²the constitution of 
as a political and economic conjuncture as a moment of crisis.   
 There is, once again, a certain irony here. For the constructivist institutionalism that is 
the focus of this debate has its origins in and, in a sense, developed out of, my earlier work on 
the analysis of crisis and the mobilization of moral panics (especially Hay 1995 and 1996). 
What strikes me now, SDUWLFXODUO\LQWKHOLJKWRI/DUVVRQ¶VFULWLTXH is that that earlier analysis 
contains within it a rather more nuanced and sustained discussion of the relationship between 
intra- and inter-subjectivity than exists in any of the more explicitly constructivist 
institutionalist interventions that followed. I am, then, particularly grateful to Larsson for the 
opportunity to rediscover and to re-state more explicitly that, until now, rather implicit 
element of the approach.   
 For constructivists, the crux of the politics of crisis is, predictably enough, interpretive 
ambiguity and the politics in and through which attempts are made to resolve it. There are two 
elements to this. Each can be seen as the answer to a question, with the interpretive ambiguity 
(and associated political contingency) residing in the fact that there is more than one credible 
answer to that question. The first is the question of whether this is or is not a crisis; the second, 
assuming an affirmative answer to the first, asks: what is the object and hence the nature of 
this crisis?   
 Constructivists thus treat crises as social rather than natural facts. Of course, it is 
perfectly possible that a series of natural facts set, in effect, the context within which crisis 
(and conceivably non-crisis) narratives compete to define what is going on and what type of 
response is appropriate²as, for instance, in some kind of ³natural disaster´ (a tsunami, an 
earthquake, a forest fire, a sustained drought). More usually²and indeed invariably, even in 
the wake of naturally precipitated disasters like earthquakes²it is a combination of social and 
natural facts that set the context in which crisis narration occurs, placing limits on the 
³narratability´ of the crisis (and, indeed, the credibility of a crisis narrative in the first place).  
Yet, in periods that come to be perceived as, say, economic crises, most of the preconditions 
of crisis narration relate to social facts (the number of bank insolvencies, the cost of 
government borrowing, and trends in ³key economic indicators´ such as the rate of growth of 
economic output, inflation, or unemployment, for instance).   
 But crucially, the combination of natural and social facts that might be seen to define 
the context in which crisis narration takes place do not determine the outcome, even if they 
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contribute to the probability that a given moment will come to be seen as a crisis and a crisis 
of a particular kind. For constructivists, at least, it is only narratives that can achieve this.  
Crises, in the end, are discursive constructions; it is through narration that they come to 
acquire their social facticity.   
 But to achieve social facticity, the crisis narrative needs to be accepted. As this 
suggests, the clash of competing attempts to define the crisis is, invariably, a clash of public 
narratives. At the risk of re-stating the obvious, this is a necessarily inter-subjective process; 
and that, of course, implies that the constructivist analysis of crisis is also inter-subjective. It 
is perhaps unnecessary to labor the point further, save to note that had Larsson seen my work 
on crisis as emblematic or even representative of the constructivist institutionalism he 
challenges, as I would claim it is, he would have had, I think, more difficulty in characterizing 
the latter as subjectivist or even intra-subjectivist.   
 But that is perhaps not the key point here. For my analysis of the clash of crisis 
narratives (and of moral panic discourses, too) contains within it a treatment of their reception 
by citizens and hence of the relationship between inter- and intra-subjectivity. This draws not 
RQ/DUVVRQ¶VIDYRred post-structuralists, but on their now rather less illustrious structuralist 
forebears, Lacan and Althusser²and, in particular, on their concept of interpellation. It is 
worth briefly revisiting them because they produced a rare, clear ,and sustained reflection on, 
and theorization of, the interdependence of intra- and inter-subjectivity. In a sense, they 
provide an answer to the question that Larsson poses but fails to answer.  
 In his rightly famous essay on ideology, Althusser (1971) gives the example of the 
police officer hailing a citizen on the street with the words, ³Hey you there´ In the process of 
WXUQLQJWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKHSROLFHPDQ¶VFDOO$OWKXVVHUVXJJHVWVWKHFLWL]HQKDVEHHQ
interpellated. For in the very act of recognizLQJKHUVHOIDVWKHVXEMHFWRIWKHRIILFHU¶V
exclamation, she accepts a subject position defined for her both by the hail and the authority 
with which it is delivered. She submits, in effect, to a power relationship, as her subject 
positioning, if not quite her subjectivity, is inter-subjectively constituted.    
 This conception of interpellation can be readily applied to the process of crisis 
narration.  7KXVLQP\ZRUNRQ%ULWDLQ¶VLQIDPRXV³Winter of Discontent´ I examine how 
media crisis narratives construct subject positions for their readers, drawing them and their 
subjectivity into a script that serves both to cement the perception of crisis and to attribute 
responsibility for its causation, whilst legitimating the decisive intervention required to put 
things right.  As I explain, these texts 
 
 effectively construct an empty story board which recruits readers as dramatis 
personae upon an expansive stage created within the text itself. [This] 
comprises a basic set of characters, plot relationships, minimal relevant 
aspects of context and a variety of inter-discursive cues, intended associations 
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and connotations. It invites us as readers . . . to identify with a particular 
³preferred´ subject position (the victim, the hero, the heroine, the 
underdog . . . ). If we do not overtly and consciously resist this interpellation 
by breaking or at least suspending the momentary spell of the text, then we 
actively position ourselves as subjects within the narrative. We recognize 
ourselves (as the victim, hero, heroine, underdog . . . ) as we locate ourselves 
within a subject position inscribed in the text. . . . In this instant, we are 
constituted as subjects through the text, as we are simultaneously subjected to 
it. (Hay 1996, 262)   
 
This process I go on to illustrate in some textual detail, considering a range of media sources 
from the time. One specific example will perhaps here suffice²a story published in the Daily 
Mail on 1 February 1979, under the headline ³7+(<:21¶7(9(1/(786%85<285'($'´  
The story relates to the then-ongoing industrial dispute between Liverpool City Council and 
FRXQFLOZRUNHUVLQFOXGLQJWKHFLW\¶VJUDYH-diggers. It was published at the heart of the Winter 
of Discontent.   
 The preferred subject position is clear. ³We´ are invited to recognize ourselves in this 
text as those who have recently lost a family member or close friend and are now prevented 
from burying them by the sinister and cruel conduct of ³them´ the striking grave-diggers (and 
others like them responsible for the condition of crisis in and through which ³we´ are living² 
and from which ³we´ are suffering). If we do not actively resist this interpellation, it is clear 
where our sympathies will lie and our ire will be directed, as we adopt the vantage point of the 
bereaved, denied the basic human decency of being able to bury ³our´ loved ones. We share 
in the collective revulsion at the anticipated ³putrefaction of the corpses of our family and 
friends´[Åcitation?]. Thus far, it is all inter-subjective. But we respond to the story, if 
interpellated, intra-subjectively: by filling out the simple construction of the victim presented 
in the text. In a complex interweaving of inter- and intra-subjective elements, we populate the 
incomplete and partial character of the bereaved described in the text with our own experience 
and memories, thereby projecting ourselves (and our subjectivities) into a setting framed by 
the media yet brought to life through our own imaginations.   
 This is an almost perfect fusion of inter- and intra-subjectivity ± and, as such, very 
typical of how social facts are made and remade.   
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